abstract: Both Continental and analytic traditions have tended to associate Hegel's idealism with metaphysics and therefore as divorced from and even pernicious to reality.
Epistemologically and politically, metaphysics have been reproached for their pernicious disregard for something called "reality."
In both the Continental and analytic traditions, Hegel's philosophy has been seen as embodying all that is wrong with metaphysical endeavors. From Feuerbach to Foucault, from Great Britain to North America and beyond, the prejudice against metaphysics and the attendant yearning to sink philosophical teeth into something "real" have consequently colored Hegel's reception. Even today, if the German Idealist is no longer anathema, it is largely because most of those working on him have managed to concentrate on discrete areas of his oeuvre where they find material worthy of their own nonmetaphysical interests. Thus, the so-called Pittsburgh Hegelians, Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and Robert Brandom, concentrate mainly on elements in Hegel where they find addressed their empiricist/realist concerns, for example, the Sense-Certainty chapter in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
1 Others, such as Kenneth Westphal, have read Hegel as an epistemologist; John Russon has read him as a phenomenologist; Dean Moyar and Michael Quante have read him as an ethicist; Jere Surber has shown him to be a philosopher of language; Patricia Mills and others have found Hegel to be a rich source for feminist reflection. Robert Pippin has inspired some to see Hegel as carrying on the Kantian critical tradition.
2 Still others, such as Terry Pinkard, find Hegelian inspiration for their own political philosophies of modern liberalism.
While all of these approaches have certainly broadened and deepened Hegel studies, bringing to light new dimensions of and perspectives on his thought, most contemporary Hegel scholars are still careful to avoid the metaphysical bugbears associated with him. Above all, this means deflating the systematic pretensions of Hegel's Wissenschaft where scholars may find themselves confronted with the spooky godlike entity he calls the Idea. Similarly, for some, das Absolute represents an unfortunate feature of their philosopher's idealism, an aspect that is particularly difficult to explain away in nonmetaphysical terms. It often seems more prudent and " scientific" to concentrate on areas of Hegel's work where such chimeras can be set aside. Ironically, by focusing research on his specific writings on perception, consciousness, language, existence, economics, ethics, law, life, nature, politics, and so on, much contemporary Hegel scholarship seeks not only to preserve these "real" elements from metaphysical abstraction but to actually use them to challenge the systematicity of the very philosophy in which they make sense! Within Hegel's system (aka Science) itself, the Logics are considered the privileged locus for abstract metaphysical reflection. This is understandable when, by Hegel's own account, the Encyclopedia Logic and the Greater Logic (also known as the Science of Logic) are meant to articulate such purely idealist expressions as "the Idea in the abstract element of thinking." 3 Hence, far less scholarly ink is spent on the Logics than on other works in the oeuvre. When the Logics are addressed, commentators can be roughly divided into those who take the works' metaphysical dimensions seriously and those who try to avoid them. Both are faced with difficulties. On one hand, metaphysical readers of the Logics, such as Charles Taylor, tend to set themselves the onerous task of having to explain how all of reality follows the more or less rigorous dialectical program that Hegel's logic supposedly presents, a task that, as Taylor himself writes, "may sound mad . . . to most philosophers." 4 On the other hand, nonmetaphysical readers of the Logics (e.g., Stephen Houlgate, John Burbidge, and William Maker) tend to read them as divorced from any ontotheological considerations, that is, as works of what we generally understand as "logic": self-referential demonstrations of thought thinking itself, removed from any external foundations or presuppositions.
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Of course, these nonmetaphysical approaches encounter their own challenges. How can the process of thought that Hegel describes "begin" if it has nothing presupposed to think about? How can the veracity of the transitions in the Logics be guaranteed without reference to anything else? More fundamentally, if we take seriously the systematic aspirations of Hegel, what is the relation between the nonmetaphysical reading of the Logics and the other realphilosophische elements of the system: Nature and Spirit? The most popular response to these fundamental questions is once again to confine one's investigations to discrete elements, this time within the Logics themselves.
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I would like to propose a systematic, metaphysical reading of Hegel's Logics that fully recognizes their ontological mission without engendering the "madness" that Charles Taylor mentions above: the claim that reality runs along preset logical lines. At the same time, my reading means to avoid the charge of undue, pernicious abstraction. In a word, I want to show how Hegel's Logics seek to ground being as scientifically knowable, in the form of nature. In order to begin to understand the metaphysics of Hegelian thought, we must understand the term itself in a deeper way than simply meaning "idealistic" or "abstractly conceptual" or even "ideological." I will attempt to outline how Hegel's metaphysics share the object assigned by Aristotle in his work on the subject, where they are defined as first philosophy or the science of being as being. While Hegel's Logics may indeed tell the tale of thought thinking itself, the truth is that thought only thinks itself to the extent that it thinks something other than itself, and that otherness is being. In other words, in showing us how thought thinks itself thinking being, the Logics also recount the attendant determinations of being. It is through these thought determinations that being comes to be scientifically knowable for us. Because we are the thinking, determining agents involved in this account, Hegel's metaphysics, as the science of being as being, has a pronounced anthropological dimension.
Hegel's metaphysics tell us that being that is not determined, in other words, that is not thought of, is in fact nothing at all. Of course, hard-core materialists will maintain the contrary: reality exists independently of thought, or further still, thought itself is just another feature of material reality. However, according to Hegel, even such radical materialism is only another (metaphysical) way of thinking (i.e., determining) being (qua material) and as such not fundamentally different from radical (subjective) idealism, which is another one-sided way of thinking (determining) being. In fact, as thinking agents, we are inextricably related to the worlds we determine ourselves to be in, and reciprocally, these worlds reflect an essential aspect of our thinking.
Given the anthropological dimension of metaphysics, that is, the intimate relation between ourselves as thinking agents and determinate being, it should not be surprising that Hegel's ontological reflections are centered on a logical form that is essentially grammatical. Language mediates the relation between thought and being (between ourselves and the world) because it is the actual realization of both; that is, words and the structures in which they take place are real, worldly occurrences invested with our thoughts. As Hegel writes, "The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and maintained in language"; 8 or again, "It is in words that we think."
9 If we accept our role in thinking/determining the realities that we inhabit, then we must also acknowledge the linguistic aspect of our world. Consequently, the logical forms that are present in our thinking/determining of being should also be seen as grammatical and ontological. The linguistic nature of this determinacy is perfectly appropriate to the anthropological agency of thought itself.
The fundamental grammatical form of systematic philosophy, of Hegelian Wissenschaft, is the predicative proposition (Satz) called judgment (Urteil), 10 to use the logical terminology of the day. It is within this form that determinate being arises. This is why the Greater Logic introduces undetermined being as initially nothing in a written phrase that is not a proposition or judgment, in a phrase that has no copula, no conjugated verb to be between grammatical subject and predicate: "Being, pure being, without any further determination," Hegel begins. Such unpredicated being, he then continues, can be "nothing more nor less than nothingness."
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Being appears first as totally undetermined and consequently as nothing since there is no copula that is there to determine its existence qua something; consequently, pure being is not anything (for us) at all.
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The reliance on judgment as the privileged form of ontology is understandable and even necessary if we refer back to what I take as Hegel's fundamental intuition, that of the agency of thought itself. Thought posits itself; it is essentially a Setzen and consequently must first present itself as a Satz (proposition). This idea of the ontological self-positing proposition is certainly derived from Fichte's much debated and discussed fundamental principle of all science, Ich bin Ich, a paradigmatic form of judgment that Hegel's early friend Hölderlin, in his text "Urteil und Sein," helped him understand as the original sharing out of identity into difference.
13 As I will show, it is through the interplay between identity and difference that Hegel sees meaningful being arise in the judgment's copula.
In the Logics, being comes to be determined as something significant through the copula, the verb to be that relates subject to predicate in the logical form of determinant, predicative judgment. Such existing determination is fully expressed neither in the subject nor in the predicate but in the is of the copula, telling us that what is determined has some degree of concrete, existing being. The destiny of the judgment form is the "fulfillment" of the copula and the passage to a more concrete form of linguistic determination, realized in Hegel's conception of the syllogism. This is why, in EL 180, at the end of the chapter on judgment, we find the move to the syllogism expressed as the Erfüllung of the copula, a term that can be translated either as "fulfillment" (the choice of Harris, Geraets, and Suchting) or as actual "filling."
14 I hyphenate ful-fillment in the title of this essay in order to emphasize the ambiguity of Erfüllung: as both the fulfillment or destiny of the copula and its actual filling, so that the verb to be comes to really mean what it says through the carried-out determination of being. With this filling, the judgment form actually moves beyond itself to its "truth," in Hegelian parlance, and becomes the syllogism, "the form of what is truly rational" (EL 181), that is, what Hegel refers to as the realized Concept, which I will further explain below. 15 It is in this sense that the judgment form alone "does not lend itself to expressing what is concrete" (EL 31 Remark). 16 In more conventional terms, we might say that Hegel's move from judgment to syllogism reminds us that systematic philosophy must involve predicative statements logically folded into an organic structure of argument.
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The fact that in the copula we are dealing with real filling and not just fulfillment is clear when we consider Hegel's use of the term empty to describe the unfulfilled (i.e., unfilled) copula in EL 180 and when we consider the corresponding moment in the Greater Logic, where Hegel describes the erfüllte copula as inhaltsvolle, or "contentful." The copula is consequently no longer "abstract," a synonym here for empty, formal, and devoid of existence, but now relatively concrete. What first appeared, in judgment, as an empty verb linking subject to predicate now really is as the existing, unifying movement between thought and being, which is precisely what Hegel calls the Concept. Thus, "the Concept is the filling of the empty 'is' of the copula," as we find in EL 180.
18
With the passage from the proposition's grammatical is to "is" as an actual positing (determining) of being, we move from the logical to the ontological. In so doing, the Concept now takes its truest form, that of the syllogism, the final form of "Subjective Logic," the second half of both the Encyclopedia Logic and Greater Logic. The move from the logical to the ontological takes place because the filled copula becomes, within the Hegelian syllogism, the moment of particularity, the existing and essential middle term between the universal (general) and the singular (individual). It is here, in particularity, where things take on specific qualities and cease being either empty generalities or abstract individualities. For example, in order for me really to be someone, I must take on such particular qualities as "male," "Canadian," "father," "professor," "middle-aged," and so on. To really be, I must be more determined than the generalized "all men" or the singular individual "John Doe."
Whether the thinking, determining syllogism moves from the singular through the particular to the universal or in the other direction, the moment of particularity is an expression of "external reality," of essential existence (EL 181), of things that really are what they are. Another way to put this is that the moment of particularity, in the Hegelian syllogism (aka the Concept), is where differentiation takes place within a systematic whole. As we will see, it is this feature of difference within identity that characterizes essentially meaningful existence, that is, being that is knowable for us. In terms of Hegelian Science, which is what we are discussing here, it is only through its realization in particularity that the syllogism comes to embody "everything that is rational" (EL 181; emphasis added). Science cannot grasp, and has only a passing interest in, undetermined (unthought) being.
In the syllogism, the judgment form realizes itself as "the genuine particularity of the Concept" (EL 166). The question is, How does particularity actually come into the copula? How does the abstract verb is come to actually mean what it says and express knowable being as its content? How does the logical actually become the ontological? 19 The answer is that it does so as ground (Grund), namely, as reason in the sense of "having sufficient reason" to be or what the French call raison d'être. As Hegel writes in the Greater Logic: in the syllogism, "the determined and filled [or fulfilled] copula, which before was formed by the abstract is . . . has subsequently been further constituted as the ground [Grund] in general, [and] is now present for us [vorhanden] ." 20 To put this another way, we can say that particularity is an ontological determination where being has been given reason to be and is thus presented as knowable to reason, that is, worthy of human knowing as outlined in Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences.
Consequently, to see how particular being arises in the Logics (and how being becomes knowable) through the filling of the copula, it is helpful to "go back" and look at the middle Doctrine of Essence section of the Logics, where Hegel examines determinate being as having the grounds to be. 21 As is the case (formally) in Aristotle, in Hegel, the particular, middle term of the syllogism is where essence (quiddity, meaning) is introduced, precisely because it is in this context where things take on the specific determinations that cause them to actually be something, to exist. In Hegel's Logics, such scientifically meaningful existence arises (EL 115-22) through the interplay of identity and difference, where things exist because they are both what they are and what they are not. This apparently abstract statement can perhaps be shown with the following example. It might initially appear that I am a male (my identity) simply because I am not a female (my difference). However, Hegel's dialectic of identity and difference seeks to demonstrate that this difference is also constitutive of who I am, that is, of my existing identity. My "not being a woman" actually involves incorporating differentiating womanhood into my existence. This is demonstrably the case, Hegel could argue: as an individual existence, my "reason to be" is grounded or has been brought about through the very real (copulative?) interplay between man and woman.
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It is through a discussion of ground that we see how, for Hegel, what goes beyond pure, undifferentiated identity has reason to be. Significantly, by considering ground as the determinant element of being, we see how its question opens onto anthropological perspectives. What has reason or essential grounds to be shows itself to be knowable for us as reason-seeking human agents.
23 I believe that this is what Hegel means by the variously translated term Sache: "issue," "matter," and so on, all terms relating to knowable existence as grounded, that is, as having reason to be and, hence, as significant to us.
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Knowable existence comes into the copula is through the interplay between identity and difference. It is therefore not surprising that Hegel's discussion of "Essence as Ground of Existence" (in the Doctrine of Essence) again refers to the predicative form of the proposition (Satz), the same form that we began with in the discussion of judgment and the copula. In the context of ground, however, what is now stressed is the copula's role in expressing both identity and difference, where "a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity" (EL 115).
25
In the subsection of the Doctrine of Essence that I am discussing, Hegel begins by looking at identity. This means conceiving essence simply in terms of self-identity: the essence of a thing is to be determined as self-identical, that is, to be itself, to be what it is. Here, the rule of identity presents "A = A" as the basic law of all things. Things are simply what they are. A rose is a rose is a rose.
Briefly put, what Hegel demonstrates is that judgments of identity implicitly involve difference. After that, we will see how, conversely, judgments of difference involve identity. Finally, the dialectical interplay between identity and difference will be shown to bring forth the determinate ground of existing being, that is, being that is essential or knowable for us.
First, regarding identity, if we think things through as Hegel asks us to do, we see that the very statement of identity, in fact, already implies difference (distinction). "A = A" is not really the expression of pure identity; otherwise, we would simply write "A." Obviously, there is something happening in the copula beyond the affirmation of identity. 26 In fact, a statement of identity without difference is quite simply the "negation of being and its determinations" (EL 116 Zusatz). Determinate existence (i.e., being qua something) is self-differentiating, and only through such differentiating can identity actually come to be expressed (written, spoken, stated).
Hegel then invites us to see how difference gives onto a richer, ful-filled identity, one that will be informed by such differentiation. To make his argument, Hegel evokes the logical principle of the excluded third, presented as the fundamental principle of distinction or difference. Everything is distinct from everything else. No two leaves are exactly the same, for example. Once again, Hegel refers to the propositional form of judgment. According to the principle of the excluded third, opposing predicates cannot be assigned to a subject. Thus, in Hegel's terminology, "A = either +A or −A." What is excluded is the possibility that "A = neither +A nor −A" but, rather, something else instead. However, in excluding "the third" that is neither +A nor −A but something else, the principle in fact recognizes it, recognizes it as something else (excluded) that is actually posited between the positive and negative poles. "Even the mere plus and minus of number have zero for their third term," writes Hegel in EL 119.
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Thus, the principle of difference or distinction, expressed as a predicative judgment, implies the reality of a third, middle term, an enriched identity now conceived as the ground from which things actually come into existence. As I showed above, such ground or "reason to be" expresses the dynamic interplay between identity and difference, as instantiated in the copula is, whose destiny is fulfilled in the syllogism's moment of particularity. Such grounds present themselves for us in the language of predication.
The truth of the matter is that identity is always self-differencing and difference is always self-differencing or the differencing of an identity. The identity of identity and difference, that is, the movement from identity to difference and "back" to identity, is the Hegelian Concept, the real, selfmediating identity of thought, through which things present themselves to us as grounded or having reason to be and, hence, as knowable. This " knowability" takes on the determinate forms of those transcendental (Kantian) categories that have now been "deduced" into being itself, qua nature. In other words, nature can now be known according to the categories of quality, quantity, modality, and relation, more or less the same categories that Aristotle presupposed to be in nature itself.
Concretely, we understand that finite things, existing things, carry within themselves the contradiction of being both what they are and what they are not; they are both self-identical and self-differencing. This inner contradiction is what determines things as coming into existence, changing, and finally ceasing to exist, as Heraclitus perceived. The inherent contradiction that determines the real, grounded existence of things also implies their relation to other things. Indeed, to exist is to be something, which means being finitely and hence being in the sway of other finite things that are something else; such engaging "elseness" is thus an essential part of what things actually are and, as such, opens them up to us as possible objects of knowledge. 28 It also is what presents things to us as meaningful, gives our minds purchase in coming to know them, for example, through their causal relations to other things.
We could follow knowable being through higher or more determinate levels of reality, in the first "Objective" half of the Logics, beyond the being of finite, singular things and through the logical moments of Erscheinung (phenomenon) 29 and Wirklichkeit (actuality), but that is not necessary to demonstrate my point, which has been to show that Hegel's logic, as an expression of his metaphysics, is the science of the determinate grounding of being. For us, as scientists, as knowing agents in the Encyclopedia narrative, existing being arises in the copula of the judgment form and is further instantiated in the middle, particular moment of the syllogism, that is, in the realized structure of what Hegel calls the Concept. Judgments and syllogisms are thus the two fundamental elements of all philosophical grammar.
References to judgment and syllogism do, however, require us to visit (briefly) the second, Subjective part of the Logics, where these grammatical forms of thought are explicitly dealt with and where knowable being now appears as "the Object" of natural science, that is, objectivity determined in terms of mechanics, chemistry, and (organic) teleology. Predictably, the "Object" section is found in the second, particular, differentiating position within Subjective Logic, thus corresponding to the same middle moment of syllogistic particularity that Essence occupies in the first half of the Logics (Objective Logic), where we saw knowable being come into existence through its grounds. However now, within Subjective Logic, the ultimate, teleological determination of "the Object" indicates the ultimate scientific purpose (reason to be) of being. Whereas for Kant, the purposiveness of nature remained a regulatory idea of reason, Hegel's Logics aim to demonstrate how the teleological determination that grounds natural science comes to be through the thinking (human) agency of the Idea itself.
The same grammatical ontology we discovered earlier is at work in the Subjective side of the Logics, which is why Hegel writes, in EL 193 Remark, just before the middle section on "the Object": "The ground from which existence emerges (and) the relationship that sublates itself into actuality are nothing but the still imperfectly [noch unvollkommen] posited Concept." As we have seen, the complete positing of the Concept takes place when judgment's copula is ful-filled in the realized syllogism. 30 With such ful-fillment, Hegel remarks further on in the same text, "The Perfect [das Vollkommene] is that which is not merely in a subjective way but in an objective way as well" (EL 193 Remark). However, in reaching this point of completion or perfection, where thought and being are mutually determinant, we have already moved beyond the emergence of knowable objects and on to their full grasp (sublation) within the dynamic structure of the syllogism, with its organic moments of universality, particularity, and singularity.
In the Logics, the difference between the Objective and Subjective "sides" can perhaps best be understood as one of perspective. Whereas in Objective Logic (the Doctrines of Being and Essence) content arises from the cumulative determinacy of being (out of nothingness), in Subjective Logic (aka the Doctrine of the Concept) content is "deduced" from the cumulative determinacy of thought. In fact, of course, the two actions are reciprocal and not redundant. Because the second half of the story, Subjective Logic, presupposes the logical forms of thought-judgment and syllogism-as conceptually complete, its account is necessary in order to arrive at fully determined being as a whole, that is, as nature. Without this narrative rounding out, that is, the syllogistic perfecting (Vollkommen) that is recounted in Subjective Logic, determinate being can only arrive at the endless reiterations of Actuality (Wirklichkeit), which closes the first (Objective Logic) half of the Logics. To arrive at the holistic presentation of nature as determinate, knowable being, the ful-filled copula must be comprehended within the absolute judgment (Urteil) between the Objective and Subjective sides of the Logics (S = O or O = S) in the self-positing, self-differentiating identity that Hegel refers to, at the end of the Logics, as the Idea.
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Viewing the Idea in this light, as a Satz of grammatical ontology, responds to a problem that Schelling identified in his Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy: the apparent redundancy of the Idea within Hegel's Encyclopedia system, appearing as it does at the end of the Logics and again at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit, in the guise of Absolute Spirit's selfknowing self-enjoyment. The answer to Schelling's misunderstanding is this: in the Logics, the Idea is presented as grounding truth and its knowledge through the conceptual adequation of thought and being, whereas at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit, the Idea appears as the actual carrying out of that adequation (truth) in the system known as Science, which must involve the Realphilosophien of Nature and Spirit. These subsciences would not be possible if we had not already established the possibility of knowledge itself.
I want to pick up again, briefly, the story of knowable being, now as the syllogized, content-ful copula, in its last moments, allowing us to discover the final destiny of fully determined and grounded being in the Logics. As I said at the outset, what happens to the copula's content reveals being's significance, that is, what it is for us. To put this another way, the conceptual destiny of the syllogism's particular middle term reveals the truth of the copula, its realized essence or meaning. What happens is this: in the final moments of the Logics, the fully accomplished, perfect (Vollkommene) syllogism, qua the Idea, lets itself out, freely releasing itself ("sich frei aus sich zu entlassen"); 32 in doing so, it reveals itself to us as nature (EL 244), which might now be somewhat playfully called the Idea's significant Other.
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At the end of the Logics, this action is described as flowing from a sich entschliessen, which might be translated as a resolving or "deciding" on the part of the Idea, a meaning that allowed Schelling to make fun of Hegel for entertaining such an absurd notion: the Absolute Idea reflectively and arbitrarily deciding to become nature. However, I believe that we have to see this sich entschliessen for what it is: a dis-closure, an opening up, or better still, a desyllogizing (schliessen = to conclude, to close, or to syllogize) where the fully determined, perfect syllogism reveals itself in its truth (the unity of thought and being). Thus, at the end of the Logics, we may translate in the following way. The Idea "de-syllogizes itself, freely releasing out of itself the moment of its particularity . . . as nature" (EL 244). The moment of particularity is the moment of knowable being, which now, at the end of the logic, is fully determined and grounded; it now has every reason to be and so is. 34 What is disclosed is the Idea's essential middle term, being, now determined as nature, knowable for us, scientists of nature. This is the destiny of the copula, through its interplay of identity and difference, grounded in the particular middle term of the syllogism; it is desyllogized (discovered) for us as significant otherness that can be known. Consequently, the Logics can be understood as responding to the most fundamental epistemological questions: How is it possible that our thought may correspond to nature, that we may know nature? Further still, why should we care to know nature? The answer: because nature has reason (grounds, purpose) to be.
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I will finish on the anthropological note that I evoked at the beginning. The outcome of Hegel's grammatical ontology is nature, which may now be defined as existing being that has been determined to be knowable for us. Since, for Hegel, knowledge of otherness always involves self-recognition in that other, we may surmise that to know nature is to recognize in it our own thinking selfhood, our own reason, and finally, our own freedom. The discovery of freedom in the heteronomy of nature (nature's liberation, we might also say), which is the theme of Hegel's subsequent Philosophy of Nature, would be impossible if being were not already determined by thought as meaningful and grounded. This is what happens in the Logics if we read them as the metaphysical science of being. To know nature is now to recognize in it the possibility of our own freedom and thereby to begin to realize it. Perhaps this is what lies behind Hegel's enigmatic, seemingly cautionary statement: "It is unsettling when a nation [Volk] loses its metaphysics." 36 notes 1. Globally, these thinkers are interested in problems on the status of "truth claims," i.e., how language can accurately tell the truth about empirical reality. The implied separation that this pursuit implies between thought, reality, and language strikes me as deeply un-Hegelian. Hegel's "Logic": From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006) . For Burbidge, Hegel's Logics should be understood as we understand logic generally: as dealing with the processes of thought as divorced from metaphysical investigations. Thus Burbidge prefers the Greater Logic since in it we are better "able to examine how thought functions on its own" (Logic of Hegel's "Logic, " 25) , whereas in the Encyclopedia Logic, "the dynamic movement by which thought develops is lost" (Logic of Hegel's "Logic, " 120) . For Maker, the Logics, like Hegel's systematic philosophy as a whole, are "self-grounding, self-determinative, presuppositionless or autonomous" (Philosophy Without Foundations, 96) . And near the beginning of his book, Houlgate writes: "Hegel's Science of Logic may not be the easiest book in the world to read, but there is, to my mind, no mystery surrounding its purpose. It provides an extensive analysis of the basic categories of thought" (Opening of Hegel's "Logic, " 9) . As she so eloquently writes, "The Concept does not need to be applied to intuitions because it is its own content and determinacy; it is the drive of being as being thought as much as it is the drive of thinking that thinks itself. The absoluteness of absolute idealism is due to its being both an idealism and a materialism, both a logic and an ontology" ("Hegel's Logic of Actuality," 142). More recently, Nathan Ross writes, "Hegel's Science of Logic is a bold attempt to redefine logic so that it no longer involves merely examining the forms of arguments, in isolation from their truth content, but the actual nature of concepts and hence the ultimate nature of reality." Nathan Ross, "Metaphysics," in G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts, ed. Michael Baur (London: Routledge, 2015) , 31-43, at 33. I want to show how such "truth content" is developed in the copula of the judgment form, finally presenting knowable being as nature. an existence enlivened by thought. This existence is absolutely necessary to our thoughts." 10. Hegel distinguishes between "proposition" and "judgment" according to the scientific destination of the latter, in contrast to the former's general, common language usage (EL 167 Remark). This distinction is crucial in grasping how Hegel's "theory" of language is principally concerned with defining and refining its participation in scientific objectivity. Where I generally agree with J. Hyppolite's comprehension of the Logics as grounded in the "identity of thought and the thing thought of" and that the resultant reality (Wirklichkeit) "understands and expresses itself in language" qua Logos, I disagree with Hyppolite's extension of such language to all that is "human." Hegel distinguishes between everyday, common language and its scientific (wissenschaftlich) Judgement, justifies his not "making any substantial reference . . . to the syllogism" (an absence that he claims to share with Werner Salomon and ChongFuk Lau) thus: "Indeed, the syllogism does not replace the judgement as the locus of the expression of truth, as if the two were completely distinct elements. Rather, it provides only a more detailed version of the form and content of the judgement of the concept" (319). Such a view obviously does not understand the ful-filled copula as the syllogism's moment of particularity, as I am arguing. Although, refreshingly, Trisokkas avoids the jargon of analytic philosophy, he shares with the Pittsburgh "Hegelians" a primary interest in the status and possibility of "truth claims" and their ability to reflect (material) reality. On the complicit relationship between scientific language and objectivity in Hegel, see Jeffrey Reid, Real Words: Language and System in Hegel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) , particularly the chapter on the ontological nature of judgment in Hegel. 16 . "Abstract," in Hegel, generally means one-sided or unilateral. Concreteness involves the interplay of contradictory positions, which are ultimately expressions of thought and being. Thus, the ground of existing being, as we will see, involves the fundamental interplay between identity (thought) and difference (being).
17. The structural, organic nature of Hegel's use of the syllogism is far removed from its formal employ, which Hegel criticizes repeatedly: "Caius is a man; all men are mortal; therefore, he is mortal. Personally, I have never thought of anything so dull. It must be produced somewhere in our gut, without our being conscious of it." G. ). An acid is only an acid with regard to its self-distinction from the alkaloid. Or in physics, polarity (electric, magnetic) produces an existing center, a magnetic body that is the existing identity between the two. The same fundamental idea informs Schelling, the philosophy of identity, and the physicist Ritter's reading of galvanism as showing water to be constituted by positive and negative gases (hydrogen and oxygen). 28. Significantly, the dialectic of finitude/infinity informs the determinations of Being in the Logics, both as Quality (Being-there) and as Quantity (Quantum). See EL 92 Zusatz: "Thus we suppose, for instance, that the moon, which is something else than the sun, could quite well exist if the sun did not. But, in fact, the moon (as something) has its other in itself, and this constitutes its finitude." 29. I believe that "phenomenon" is a more satisfying translation for Erscheinung since the "appearance" that Hegel is discussing in EL 132-41 is one that is scientifically significant: a phenomenon. 30. The German term Vollkommen (perfection) expresses the "complete arrival" of the Concept at its syllogistic term. Regarding the copula and the Concept, see EL 166: "The copula 'is' comes from the nature of the Concept, of being identical with itself in its alienation." 31. Overall, the Logics can be said to articulate, in a completely different way, Schelling's definition of the Absolute as S = O. I am trying to show how, for Hegel, this absolute Urteil involves the emergence of knowable being in the copula (=) through the dynamic interplay of identity and difference. Schelling tends to see the copula as an original unity that underlies all differentiation. 32. The "letting itself out" or "unbuckling" metaphor comes from Jean-François Marquet, who likened the ful-filled Idea to a replete diner having to let out his belt after a particularly substantial and satisfying meal. There are too many interpretations of sich frei entlassen to mention. One interesting one was advanced by John Burbidge at the 2006 conference of the Ontario Hegel Organization, in Montreal: "makes itself redundant." While this is certainly a common euphemism for "being let go" (another euphemism for being fired), I still do not understand how, in Hegel, the Idea can ever be made redundant. After all, it does have the final (and first?) word at the very end of the Encyclopedia, through the words of Aristotle. Elsewhere, I have advanced the hermeneutic device of reading sich frei entlassen in terms of the big bang theory of cosmology (Real Words, (54) (55) (56) (57) .
33. My contention that the Logics determine being as scientifically meaningful or significant responds to a major issue in Hegel studies: Just how "other" is his pronounced otherness of nature within the systematic articulation (Concept) of
